

# Post-Communist Syndrome



MARTINA KLICPEROVÁ-BAKER



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**Democracy?**

Motto: The state is not endangered from outside, as has happened many times in the past, but from within. We are putting it at risk by our own lack of political culture, of democratic awareness, and of mutual understanding.

Václav Havel

## Part I. Theoretical framework

### 1.1 The development of the totalitarian mind

Socialization in a totalitarian society taught its citizens to cope with the oppressive environment either by succumbing to coercion or by living under ubiquitous social pressure fraught with moral dilemmas (Havel, 1977; Shipler, 1984; Kagan, 1992; Klicperová, 1994). In general, totalitarian societies produced totalitarian minds.

Totalitarianism was based on political coercion and the concentration of political, social and economic control in the hands of the communist party (Arendt, 1968; Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1956; Aron, 1968; Friedrich et al., 1969; Gleason, 1995). Vacková (1990) pointed out that the system strove to keep its members in a state of immaturity so they would fit the obedient „infantilized“ society. Strict child rearing practices in families and at school as well as the awareness of the omnipresent „Big Brother“ fostered conformity. The attempted „oversocialization“ (Nickolov & Grathoff, 1991) into groups („collectives“) suppressed individuality and the persistent negative feedback punished initiative. Failures were attributed to flaws in personality, therefore *degrading individual's self-concept* and thereby further weakening their level of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1994). In contrast, certain social strata (workers, miners) were idolized as a chosen vanguard class on the basis of ascribed social origin.

Party control of mass media and biased, dogmatic curricula attempted ideological reeducation. A *fabricated world view* was presented where Soviet people were depicted as virtuous models for everyone and the Soviet Union itself was depicted as a country of progress, prosperity and freedom—in contrast to Western nations, which were portrayed as unjust, exploitative, and imperialist.

Although this propaganda was not generally believed, it produced confusion and doubts about reality (Almond, 1983). Cognitive as well as moral conflicts resulted from *two conflicting versions of reality* that co-existed side by side:

- Official propaganda created a rosy world of false ideological images, and citizens were constantly reminded that these images represented the approved reality. Thus, at a certain point the communist/socialist regime labeled itself „really existing socialism“ and the artists were only allowed to produce Utopian fantasies in the style of „socialist realism.“ Yet, this virtual reality was real indeed, in the sense that everyone's life depended upon their acknowledgment of and loyalty to it.
- Simultaneously, there was the actual reality—the dangerous, dismal truth (Havel, 1991; Kolakowski, 1978; Zinovev, 1983, see also Chapter 2 of this volume).

This double *standard of truth*—a conflict between official ideology and reality—led to a system of double morality. The version of truth enforced by the regime was practiced in public, at work, and at school; the other was visible only in the private spheres of life. („Take it as a role,“ was a friendly advice to bridge the moral schizm.) The moral duplicity of the „divided self“ (Šebek, 1990; Scheye, 1991), along with an „inability of self-reflection“ (Příhoda, 1990), distorted processes of socialization and degraded citizens' moral and psychological health.

*Moral duplicity* was the fulcrum of the totalitarian system during the Brezhnev era. It was captured in all of its corruptive power in the „wonders of socialism“ joke that spread throughout the Soviet empire: „Everyone is employed but no one works; no one works, but the Plan is fulfilled up to 105%; the Plan is fulfilled 105% but there is nothing in the stores to buy; there is nothing in the stores but people have everything; people have everything but they are cursing the regime day and night; everybody curses the regime but at election times people vote 100% for it“ (Možný, 1991, p 21).

Czechoslovakia experienced vain and abortive attempts to overcome the totalitarian predicament. The sense of powerlessness arose in post-Munich Czechoslovakia, it was compounded during the Communist coup of 1948, and reinforced again for the following generation by the Soviet

invasion in 1968 and the subsequent process of „normalization.“ This experience resulted in a state of *collective learned helplessness* (Seligman, 1975;

Bandura, 1995) and to a defensive *withdrawal into privacy* (i.e., „inner exile“ comprising family, friends, and a cottage in the country) and *resignation and alienation from public life* (Možný, 1991, Martin, 1990). During this period, society was infiltrated by the Communist Party activists and secret police. The development of associations independent of the state (civil society) was prevented. So, through forced conformity, powerlessness, and apathy, „the general public [...] contributed, though subconsciously, to the social foundations of the regime“ (Olshanskiy, 1989).

The capricious nomenclature was more apt to reward loyalty to the Party than merit, hard work, and accomplishment. Citizens developed practices of fraud. Shortages in the socialist economy and the vast control that the bureaucrats and civil servants (who were neither servants nor civil) had over goods distribution led to *corruption* (Šimecka, 1984). The popular slogans of the day characterized this ethos as: „We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us,“ and „He who wants a ride has to grease a wheel.“ *Stealing* from businesses of the nationalized economy was not perceived as a reprehensible act but, rather, as a natural form of retaliation against the regime („Look what I have nationalized at work today!“ ) or as „rescuing“ resources that otherwise would be left unused. Hence the popular slogan „He who does not steal from the state steals from his family.“

Repeated political purges in all areas of employment, schools, and culture resulted in *anxiety*. Constant *surveillance* by the secret police caused fear of being reported for some real or perceived transgression misdeed resulted in distrust and massive mutual suspicion. This suspicion, in combination with the frustration resulting from the scarcity of consumer goods, further contributed to an atmosphere of general resentment and envy as well as a general *decline in civility* (cf. Shipler, 1984).

National oppression and humiliation under Soviet rule had the effect of either increasing the potential for *ethnic nationalism* and xenophobia (G. Smith, 1990) or, conversely, leading to feelings akin to a national inferiority complex (Timoracky, 1975; IVVM-Rezková,1994).

The official *destruction or incapacitation of formerly functional moral institutions* (the Church, local community networks and voluntary associations) completed the impairment of morality and its corrective mechanisms. By officially endorsing collectivism, institutional child rearing, and the placement of the loyalty to the socialist regime and the Party above family, the state attempted to disrupt family ties (Bronfenbrenner, 1962).

Disillusionment with politics led to pessimism and cynicism and to *lack of hope* and vision for the future.

And then there were bribes—the numerous rewards that regime dispensed to loyal or at least passive inhabitants. (The most permissive—Hungarian version of „really existing socialism“ allowed to transform the classic Stalinist threat „Who is not with us is against us,“ to a soft version „Who is not against us is with us.“) The rewards for the masses then included magnanimous state subsidies ranging from health insurance to housing and consumer prices for food (hence the nickname for that epoch „goulash socialism“ ). „Benefits acted as perfect instruments for party/state control of the population“ (Večerník, 1995). General accessibility of the basics to the large masses very well helped to rationalize and settle for amoral decisions and brushed away possible dissonance between behavior and belief. The dictatorship of the communist party was complemented by comprehensive care for the „working man“ —the Party guaranteed the stability of the political system, an overall low crime rate, economic security with full employment, and health and welfare benefits. Since the rewards included distribution of mediocre comforts for minimal efforts to everyone, the egalitarianism of wages and standard of living guaranteed social peace. Furthermore the workers were flattered by the Marxist ideology which claimed that they—not the elites of any kind— are the valuable part of the society. This kind of moral bribery made the system legitimate in the eyes of the masses and proletariat.

So, many people gave up—in public they complied, and they reserved their revolts for privacy (within their minds and close families). For others it was easier to give in completely—identify with the aggressor to the degree that they not only behaved but thought as prescribed as well. *Totalitarian societies produced „totalitarian minds,“ indeed a cluster of symptoms that can be subsumed under a „totalitarian syndrome“ with specific pattern of cognitions, attitudes and behaviors developed in order to adapt to life under totalitarian circumstances.*

## 1.2 Totalitarian heritage of the society

Liberation came as a surprise gift to most citizens living under communist regimes (cf. Kuran, 1991). The wish „if only we could...“ came true (Mishler & Rose, 1996). The old system with all old fears yet also with most of its certainties was largely dismantled. While opportunities given by freedom were easy to accommodate, the responsibilities and the risks of freedom constituted a burden (Dvořáková & Voráček, 1993). Social and economic hardships and uncertainties led to mass frustration. Some presumed that they had been betrayed or that the revolution was stolen or had failed (Kabele, 1992). Others looked up to leaders who proposed quick, simple cures. Still others were finding safety in formation of new groups (often on an ethnic principle) and searching for scapegoats. That is how nationalism and tribalism filled the ideological vacuum (Hockenos, 1993, p.5; Hall, 1994). According to Kennedy (1994), „Communism is being replaced by alternative nationalisms, which, in some cases, feed into racism and neoracism“. Flamboyant myths were unleashed, including the „myth of the enemy, popular in all socialist countries“ (Rizova, 1993; Rosenberg, 1995). Demagogic populism was on the march (Walsh, 1990).

Paradoxically, most of the old elites remained in influential positions. Matejů & Lim (1995) describe how in the Czech Republic the former nomenklatura cadres are able to maintain their advantageous positions in the income hierarchy, mainly because they can effectively convert networking and „social capital,“ accumulated during the communist regime into „economic capital.“ Mink & Szurek (1993), Rosenberg (1993), Podgorecki (1994), Rona-Tas (1994), further illustrate the „self-perpetuating „pink nomenklatura.“ It turns out that successful transition depends not only on the introduction of market economy (e.g. Summers, 1992) but also on the amount of damage to society wrought by totalitarianism (Havel, 1992).

The longer-lived and more robust the totalitarian experience, the more arduous the transition. In this respect, countries in Central Europe which experienced 40 years of communist rule have an advantage over the nations of the Soviet Union with 70 or more years of totalitarian rule. Yet, whether the decades under Communism were a few or many and regardless of the intensity of oppression, it seems that many survivors of communism share certain psychological heritage—„a post-communist“ or (considered more generally, as a result of general totalitarian oppression that also preceded communism) „a post-totalitarian syndrome.“ The presence of specific symptoms is most poignantly pointed out by people who are able to compare psyche of the free and oppressed, e.g. by visiting foreigners and people returning from exile (Sovák, 1993; Kohák, 1992, cf. excellent general analysis of psychology of the oppressed by Prilleltensky & Gonick, 1996).

One of the most cogent characteristic of the post-communist social and psychological changes was powerfully sketched by Václav Havel in his essay „Paradise lost“ (1991):

A wide range of questionable or at least ambivalent human tendencies, quietly encouraged over the years and at the same time pressed to serve the daily operation of the totalitarian system, have suddenly been liberated as if from its straitjacket and given free reign at last. The authoritarian regime imposed an order—if that is the right expression for it—on these vices (and in doing so „legitimized“ them, in a sense). This order has now been broken down ... And thus we are witnesses to a bizarre state of affairs [...] society has freed itself, true, but in some ways it behaves worse than when it was in chains. Criminality has grown rapidly, [...] But there are other, more serious and dangerous, symptoms:

hatred among nationalities, suspicion, racism, even signs of fascism; vicious demagoguery, intrigue, and deliberate lying; politicking, an unrestrained, unheeding struggle for purely particular interests, a hunger for power, unadulterated ambition, fanaticism of every imaginable kind, [...] the rise of different mafias, the general lack of tolerance, understanding, taste, moderation, reason.

Although V. Havel refers to the Czech society, the occurrence of the same phenomena in other post-communist societies is evident and can be documented by writings of philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, writers etc. who notice similar set of symptoms and often coin a general term equivalent to our label of „post-communist syndrome“ (see Table 1). The phenomena range from a specific characteristic of „a little Czech human“ to the general prototype of „homo sovieticus“ and there analysis suggests that the pattern of symptoms is similar in various nations with communist totalitarian history, perhaps with one deviation in case of nations with frustrated imperial tendencies where the pattern of symptoms is „enriched“ by florid militant ethnic nationalism.

**Table 1. - Equivalents of “Post Communist Syndrome” in Various Countries**

AUTOR (YEAR)	SYNDROME (COUNTRY SPECIFICATION IF ANY)
Arato	Authoritarian socialist formation
Dainov (1995)	closed mentality (Bulgaria)
Fibich (1996)	mentality of real socialism
Goldfarb (1989)	post-totalitarian mind (Russia)
Halík (1993)	little Czech [malý český člověk], (Czech Republic)
Koralewicz, Ziolkowski (1990)	socialist mentality (Poland)
Lukasiewicz, Sicinski (1994)	popular thinking (Poland)
Marlin (1990-1992)	totalitarian mentality (Czech Republic)
Marody (1987)	social subconsciousness
Mikheyev (1987)	Soviet mentality
Mihailescu (1993)	psychological damage & mental stereotypes (Romania)
Milosz (1953)	captive mind
Scheye (1991)	Central European psychic structure)
Sztompka (1993)	civilizational incompetence
Tischner (1992)	Homo sovieticus
Vainshtein (1994)	totalitarian public consciousness (Russia)
Watts (1994)	socialist personality, effect of Easternization (Germany)
Zeman (1992)	totalitarian psychology – populist syndrome (Czech)

### 1.3 The post-communist syndrome

**Definition.** The post-communist syndrome is a specific pattern of individual symptoms: Cognitions, attitudes and behaviors developed during communist totalitarianism, which perseveres during the period of transition to democracy (Klicperová, 1997a).

**Typical symptoms.** Symptoms involve multiple psychological functions (cognitive defects, negative affectivity, negative emotions, conative handicaps of helpless passivity or—on the contrary shrewd resourcefulness combined with amoral attitudes) and manifest themselves on all social levels (with typical handicap on the level of citizenship and civil society). See Table 2 for listing of symptoms. In congruence with a parallel

**Table 2. - Post-Communist Syndrome - Main Symptoms**

	INDIVIDUAL LEVEL	INTER-PERSONAL LEVEL	COMMUNITY LEVEL	INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL (OFFICES, WORK, LAW)	SOCIAL STRATA LEVEL (ETHNIC, ECONOMIC)	STATE POLITICS LEVEL	INTER-NATIONAL POLITICS LEVEL	WORLD VIEW LEVEL
<b>Identity</b>	Suppressed individuality; Degraded self-esteem; low aspirations.	Familism, submissiveness, conformity; inferiority complex.	Missing identification with neighborhood & community.	Citizen concept missing system seen as a) obscure, alien and „Kafka-esque., or b) officials viewed as corruptible.	Privileged view of one's „in-group" and strong identification with it (nationalism, class consciousness, race & religious intolerance).	Government = „Them". Dependence on paternalistic state.	identity crisis. Loss of reference points Confusion Opportunism	Vulgar materialism. No global visions & need for transcendence
<b>Emotions</b>	Fear & anxiety, Uncertainty, Pessimism, Nostalgia, Depression.	Distrust outside family. Envy as result of vulgar egalitarianism.	Disinterest; Apathy.	System approached in a) distrust, fear or b) ridicule of the system, fun when cheating it	Hate, contempt & fear (xenophobia). Hate/love attitudes to the new mighty (USA, the West, tourists)	Frustration, insecurity, bitterness, anger, hate.	Nostalgia after old orders; Distrust, suspicion.	Emptiness after loss of authorities. Hopelessness loneliness
<b>Cognitions</b>	Rigid schemata; External locus of control; orientation to the past.	Dishonesty & smart cheating. Habitual use of defensive mechanisms.	Familism. No recognition for neighborhood & community.	Knowledge of the system and rights is a) poor or b) shrewd and exploitive.	Rationalized prejudice. Intolerance based on outgroup categorization. Responsiveness to populist propaganda.	B&W thinking, incapacity to deal with dissonance, make	Traditional view of hostile pacts. Confusion.	Contempt for global thinking & transcendence.
<b>Actions</b>	Learned Helplessness, powerlessness. Low self efficacy, hedonism	Low Self-assertion. Conformity. Irresponsibility, cheating	Non-participation on community level.	Poor citizenship a) due to incapacity and fear (asocial) OR b) exploitiveness. (social, antisocial)	Authoritarian (fascist) readiness. Discrimination & scapegoating, nostalgic claims	Passivity and Helplessness, avoiding challenge. Voicing	Demands for old orders	[Indifference
<b>Morals</b>	Mediocrity as a virtue. Satisfying lower rather than higher needs.	Moral relativism. Incivility, dishonesty, rudeness prevailing over moral	Absence of civic virtues (associating, activism, volunteering).	Alienation & anomie. Work ethics ridiculed Crime viewed as legitimate.	Egotism. Injustice toward the weak & helpless.	Parasitism	Preference for traditional orders over democratic values.	Demand for immediate gratification.

project by Prilelltensky & Gonik (1996) we differentiate several social levels (individual, interpersonal, community & neighborhood, systems & institutions, state and international politics, and finally a world view).

The most striking symptoms include:

a) *Learned helplessness, low efficacy* (Seligman, 1965; Bandura, 1994) avoiding initiative and responsibility (the issue of responsibility is addressed in the following chapter of this volume by J. Srnec), low self-confidence, all accompanied by an array of negative emotions ranging from fear and envy to hopelessness and pessimism (Korzeniowski, 1993). It further manifests itself by the fear of change, reverence for paternalism, collectivism, and social security (Sztompka, 1993).

b) *Specific immorality*, including normlessness, disregard for moral values and legal norms in the absence of sanctions, manifestations of incivility, corruption, rude demeanor (H. Smith, 1990) and aggressive, violent behaviors (Hockenos, 1993; Ewald & Kucharova, 1994);

c) *Lack of civic virtues*, such as public-mindedness, manifestation of anti-civic culture, political alienation and chauvinistic nationalism (Feierabend et al., 1992; Havel, 1995a).

One may wonder whether the totalitarian socialization can only lead to debilitation of citizenship or whether there can be also a *benign form of post-totalitarian experience*. After all, under some circumstances the totalitarian encounter may have a positive formative influence as well as a dangerous disease can promote maturity and straighten the hierarchy of values of struck personality. Numerous cases prove that even prolonged exposure to totalitarianism may leave intact a person living in a healthy and family environment and with valuable and true role models. Moreover, such a person may even benefit from otherwise traumatic experience since he/she values and appreciates freedoms, which can be taken for granted by the people born free. The writer Ivan Klíma wrote an essay describing unexpeted merits of oppression (1990).

**Maladaptive, regressive character.** Although originally developed as an adaptive, coping strategy against oppression, the post-communist syndrome is *maladaptive* in modern liberal societies. Its *regressive character* is manifested particularly by:

a) passivity—withdrawal, depression, helplessness and collectivism (Reykowski & Smolenska, 1993) which prevents the individual from the development and use of his/her full abilities.

b) naiveté—rigid persistence of old simplistic ideologies, responsiveness to superficial populist solutions, uncritical succumbance to nationalistic and demagogic appeals, in extreme cases joining in obedient aggression and acts of violence.

**Incidence.** The concept of post-communist syndrome should not be generalized on the whole population. To what degree its symptoms occur is a matter of speculation. The public opinion results suggest that the most vulnerable to the syndrome are citizens who are less educated, with lower socio-economic status, of older age, less active and who do not live in a state capital. A real life test of post-totalitarian preferences regularly occurs via elections. Electoral preferences yield hard data in that respect.

**Subtypes.** We mentioned already that peculiar imperial features are standing out in the frustrated citizens of countries that used to be powerful empires in the past. Even within a rather homogenous society, as a Czech society is, we can distinguish between two subtypes of the syndrome. Their divergence stands out particularly in their relation to the institutions—that is why we have split the respective fourth column in Table 2 under a) and b) categories. There are:

a) The more usual subtype where *passivity and learned helplessness prevail*. The citizens do not know their rights and are not able to demand them. These people do not vote or they choose someone who addresses them with a populist demagoguery. Analogously, these people either did not take part in the voucher privatization and if they did they imitated the choice of their friends or responded to the Barnum-style inflated advertising campaign of „Harvard“ mutual funds. In political terminology these people get a label of parochials.

b) The other subtype is in contrast *active, normless, knowledgeable of rights yet without respect for law*. Representatives of this subtype are very well versed in the new opportunities and are able to utilize them without moral scruples. With pride rather than guilt these people abuse the new regime. They are often original and innovative in their antisocial behavior. In the past these people were either stealing only by little bits so resources would not dry out („*přikrádání*“ in Czech) or they made sure they had a cover by well-connected nomenclature communists. Since the change from totalitarianism to freedom and free market the opportunities for con-artists seem to be almost unlimited: grandiose privatization schemes (Russian coined a new term for that: „*Prikhvaticia*“ composed from words *privatization & snatching*), large scale embezzlement of banks helped to coining a new term in the Czech Republic, too: *tunelování* = „tunneling out.“

The above mentioned types are psychologically and demographically very different. Based on the research of L. Burnett, Advertising/AISA (1997), we estimate that the first type would be best represented by old, widowed housewives with only basic education, living in a small town; the other would be probably best represented by young, ruthless entrepreneurs.

**Persistence.** The post-communist syndrome *does not evidence either quick or spontaneous extinction*. On the contrary, nostalgia and illusory memories of the *ancien regime* carry great momentum and stability. (So far, we have discussed the comparable time continuity in the case of the persistence of the democratic creed in previous chapters). Public opinion research confirms that nostalgia for the past regime is not decreasing. As if the wounds in memories are naturally healed, bad experiences get suppressed with the passage of time and positive memories become idealized. Thus, just as with memories of military training or labor pains, the nuisance and embarrassment of life under communism does not seem so reprehensible in retrospect. Furthermore, the increasing presence of new threats to the quality of life, such as unemployment, ethnic unrest and crime, will intensely stimulate sympathies for the security under the old regime.

**Coping with post-totalitarian syndrome.** The effects of the post-communist syndrome may be *minimized by traditions of political democracy* and of civic culture as well as by institutionalized patterns of civil society and civility still revered in some countries and in some social strata despite the totalitarian oppression (Alan, 1995). It may be *ameliorated by astute political, economic and cultural leadership* capable of providing constructive solutions to problems that challenge nations during the difficult process of transition from totalitarianism and command socialism to liberal democracy and a market economy. Present day Czech society (with a sound democratic legacy already in place) has been led to the transition process by two personalities with rather complementary character:

President Václav Havel, an enlightened, moralizing liberal intellectual (e.g., „Summer Meditations“ 1991 and „Toward civil society“ 1995b); and by Prime Minister Václav Klaus, a pragmatic economist who launched economic education campaign in economy—the voucher privatization (A road to market economy“ 1991), fostered nationalist pride („The Czech way“ 1993) and disdaining ethical universalism revised the moral codes („Ethical universalism and our epoch“ in Klaus 1996; „Ten commandments revisited“ 1993). Loyal Czech democrats were proud of their leaders and only after several very promising years have woken up to disenchantment of delayed economic and social problems. Most of the difficulties can be blamed on the two subtypes of post-totalitarian syndrome—passive irresponsibility on the one hand and ingenious and fearless abuse of the liberated market, imperfect legal system and weak law-enforcement on the other. The strongest defense against the prevalence of the syndrome is in active democratic citizenship.

**A vicious circle: post-communist syndrome can become a pre-authoritarian syndrome.** The Post-communist syndrome is a product of communist oppression but, at the same time, it may also function as a ground for a return of authoritarian (communist or fascist) regimes. The causal chain may close into a loop.

If immoral behavior becomes habitual on a large scale and if practiced by political and economic elites; if the new regime grants a free reign to the old nomenclature as well as to the new mafias (Handelman, 1995), democracy may become discredited. There are many examples from the present day Russia where democracy earns a various, even vulgar nicknames („shitocracy“, „kleptocracy“). In such a case society transforms into some nonstandard regime—mixing the old practices and elites with the new-rich and granting them all new, unlimited freedoms. Lack of the law-enforcement causes lawlessness, anomie, and alienation which can be hardly overcome by the weak civil society. General longing for the rule of a strong hand is a logical result. The viability of the newly-born democracies may be threatened and a return to some form of ruthless authoritarianism thus can be easily enabled.

## ***Part II. Empirical indicators of the post-totalitarian syndrom***

### ***1. Compelling evidence***

#### **Social pathology in post-communist countries**

Some circumstances, often compelling by their enormity, attest to the presence of a post-totalitarian syndrome: disintegration brought about by an inflamed nationalism which engulfed the former Soviet empire and Yugoslavia caused much death, suffering and destruction to an extent unprecedented in Europe since the Nazi and Stalinist era (Rummel, 1994).

Immoral behavior, normlessness, alienation and anomie causes confusion and anxiety among the populace of some Eastern European countries. Corruption on a grand scale and in the upper echelons seems commonplace today (Cinger, 1995; Frič et al. 1999; Transparency International, 1998). In all the post-totalitarian societies the crime index has risen precipitously. Marešová & Scheinost (1994) speak of a „post-communist explosion of criminality.“ They have confirmed the generally recognized rise in the crime rate (generally estimated to be approximately 300%) using statistics of victimization: an international victimization survey in 1992 showed that 25% of Czechs experienced or witnessed crime, which, in combination with a low rate of crime reporting (36.5%) represents a staggering increase when compared to the figures of the former totalitarian police state. Not only have the quantity and brutality of crimes risen—entire new branches of crime have started to flourish, including racketeering, contract killings, drug trafficking, smuggling of radioactive material and other international criminal activity (Nožina, 1997). The Prime Minister of Russia admitted at a meeting with world economists in Davos recently that a substantial part of the Russian economy is under mafia control,

**Nostalgic electoral choices.** Electoral choice typically juxtaposes the choice of living as a free, competent individual against life as a subject under a paternalistic regime. The outcome of elections may have more validity than any survey research. Most post-communist countries have produced election results which seem paradoxical to outside observers and yet are logical from the perspective of a post-totalitarian mentality. Within a few years after the revolutions which toppled them, the communist or neo-communist parties had regained power. Even the staunchly anti-communist Polish electorate voted for neo-communists (Ash, 1996; Wnuk-Lipinski, 1994; Karpinski, 1993), as did the Hungarians (Oltay, 1995). In Russia the previously disbanded communists became the strongest single party. Albeit often receiving only a small plurality of the vote, the winners typically offer a platform composed of nostalgic leftist populism and enlivened by aggressive nationalism.

### ***2. Experimental indicators***

A series of experimental probes was conducted to investigate the social capital in the post-communist countries of Central Europe and assess the type of political culture and civility (Feierabend et al. 1993-5). The results can be analyzed with a special focus on symptoms of post-communist syndrome:

#### a) Conceivable Indicators of Post-Communism in the Area of Civility

As a complete description of our main civility study is available in Chapter 4, the text below focuses solely on the contemplation of possible indicators relevant to the post-communist experience.

The study comprised an extensive questionnaire which was administered to 275 students of the social sciences—170 from Central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) and 105 American students. Schema methodology and Q factor analysis were used to extract seven factors designating types of civility acknowledged by the respondents.

**Table 3. - Seven Civility Factors. Subjects characterized by factors when a criterion of 500 factor loading was applied. Two relevant factors are highlighted and will be in details described on the following pages.**

<b>FACTORS</b>	<b>Czech</b>	<b>Poles</b>	<b>Hungarians</b>	<b>Americans</b>
I. Virtuous Citizen of Civil Society	38	17	7	33
II. Post Communist Legacy (?)	-	-	59	1
III. Politicaly Radicals Populists	-	-	-	41
IV. Tolerant, Diligent Elitist Rebels	-	39	-	1
V. Capitalist Creed	7	2	2	2
VI: Conflict-free Lazy Noc-artists (Schweik)	7	2	-	-
VII. Hardworking Bigots	8	-	-	-

From the point of view of a post-communist legacy, we can differentiate 3 main categories of factors (the factors from our study, which are illustrated in Table 3 above are used as examples):

1) *Schemata inherent to a democratic society with no apparent relation to the communist experience.* Two schemata distinctly reflected the values of democracy and a market economy: a) the primary schema of „Virtuous Citizens“ revealed by the first factor, i.e., schema which expressed tolerance, equality, fairness, and honesty; and b) the schema of the fifth factor, representing the capitalist creed and praise for the work ethic, absence of resentment towards the rich, and respect for the rule of law.

2) Schemata implying a non-democratic, oppressive experience, not necessarily originating under communist oppression but preserved during that era. These schemata which include patterns consistent with life under an oppressive regime, might be post-totalitarian but not necessarily post-communist. They include a) a specific behavioral pattern consisting of maintaining a low profile and going along by passive resistance and compromise. Such a pattern appears as the sixth factor (a minor Czech factor) and is suggestive of a character from Czech literature, the soldier Joseph Schweik. b) indices of intolerance toward minorities, scapegoating (e.g., bigoted seventh factor).

3) *Schemata suggesting a communist legacy.* We noticed two types of relevant indices: a) A distinct second factor, which could be interpreted in terms of a post-communist legacy (a closer description follows below); and b) phenomena which document socialization processes devoid of civil liberties, human rights, and political correctness, and manifested mainly by bigoted incivility and intolerance toward a minority group which seems to lag behind the new societal changes (i.e., the Romanies/Gypsies). Although these prejudices most likely developed in a traditional, conservative and authoritarian atmosphere long before the communist period (which is why we also listed them in the preceding paragraph), their prominent existence in the post-communist countries qualifies their presence in this category as well.

In the text below we focus in detail on some of the factors (schemata): the schema of the second factor, which may be interpreted in terms of the post-communist syndrome, and the sixth factor, which originated prior to the communist takeover but has been preserved as a successful coping strategy.

### Schema of the Second Factor: A Post-Communist Legacy schema?

This schema is in sharp contrast with the consistent schema of the major first factor of „Virtuous citizens.“ It is characterized by frequent contradictions and overall negative opinions about society in general (class conflict, decline of morality, cheating, bribery) as well as about selected subgroups (the undeserving rich, the selfish powerful elite, minorities one wishes would rather disappear). The top five factor scores are listed in the Table 4 below and the complete list of factor scores can be found in the Appendix to Chapter 4, pp. 135-137, in the column of Factor II).

**Table 4. - Factor II. Post-communist Legacy Five items with highest scores**

10. To get anywhere in society you must cultivate and rely on friends and family. Going through ordinary channels will not get you anywhere	2.39
23. Everyone should have an equal chance and equal say	1.86
16. If one is morally right, compromise is out of the question	- 2.15
8. An individual's responsibility for the welfare of others extends no further than the boundaries of his or her immediate circle of family and friends	- 2.17
39. I can imagine a minority member being mayor of a city and the city then functioning well	- 2.52

The schema contains an interesting pattern of responses. The highest score (-2.52) resulted from a strong disagreement with the statement: „I can imagine a minority member being mayor of a city and the city then functioning well“ (item #39). This conviction was further supported by intolerance to „some groups [which] do not measure up and it would be best if they just disappeared“ (#19, score 1.51). Yet, friendship with minorities was approved (item #17, score .99) and anti-Semitism was rejected (#18, score -.88). Respondents also claimed to value human equality highly (items #23, score 1.86 and #24, score 1.16).

Some of the items aimed at assessing honesty and integrity received indifferent responses: „The end often justifies the means“ (item #50, score .00); „If you live in a corrupt system you will have to go along with it in order to survive“ (item #13, score .05);

and „I believe in the old saying that honesty is the best policy“ (item #34, score .16). On the other hand, approval of the work ethic was more consistent and was useful in forming a clear dimension of the schema. Respondents disapproved of „avoiding work by hook or crook“ (item #1, score -1.18); they claimed that it was not „all right to report ill when you need a little free time“ (item #3, score -.61); and disapproved the statement at „Only stupid people work exceptionally hard to get ahead“ (item #5, score .82). This attitude seems to belie the *modus vivendi* under the old regime. The appearance of work, however, and not the work itself, was what counted („We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us“ claimed the folk wisdom of those days). Moreover, those who seemed lazy at work were actually simply reserving their energy for the exhausting work which awaited them at their jobs on the side and their weekend cottages. In this view, then, the question of how inconsistent the work ethic dimension is with the rest of the schema remains an open one.

Having experienced a communist and post-communist epoch, one can perceive consistency in the pattern of inconsistencies and recognize several key issues from the period of „real-existing“ or „goulash“ post-totalitarianism. Still, speculation remains an important aspect of this interpretation.

- Dual morality and hypocrisy with respect to equality and law. The schema contains substantial contradictions. For example, there are proclamations of equality (e.g. #23

„Everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say“ , received a score higher than in any other schema, 1.86), yet there is also the inability even to imagine such a state of equal rights (e.g., #39 a Romani/Gypsy mayor of the city -2.52). Furthermore, there is strong support to the very intolerant opinion expressing the desire that „some groups in the country [...] who do not measure up [...] would disappear“ (#19, score 1.51). Similarly, there is an unwillingness to obey a given law for the good of society if such a law is believed to be „personally unjustifiable“ (#27, score -.40). At the same time, there is also an appeal for law and order as „essential to the sound development of the society“ (#30, score 1.16) as well as mild consent with punishment of the guilty even to the detriment of the innocent (#20, score -.46). This duality was typical for life under totalitarian oppression (cf Scheye, 1991).

- Perspective of class antagonism. This schema strongly approves a Marxist view of class conflict. The respondents believe more than any other group in the survey that social classes represent „an important social basis of conflict“ (#26, score -1.32). More than any other group these respondents also repulsed the rich, powerful and well connected as undeserving (#14, score 1.40) and as a mighty corrupting force since they „get whatever they want by bribery or other illegal means“ (#34, score 1.60).
- Economic egalitarianism. More than any other group in the survey these respondents demanded „responsibility for the welfare of others“ (item #8, score 2.17) and resolutely refused the statement that „All in this country can make adequate living by working if only they would just get off their butts and try“ (#21, score -1.05). Yet there was indifference as to whether „people who refuse to work should be cut off from handouts“ (item #22, score .18).
- „Familism“ and networking. Since these respondents do not have illusions about the morality and honesty of their fellow-citizens (#11, #12) and are extremely critical of the rich and powerful (#42), they resort to their network of family and friends for support. More than any other group, these respondents agreed that family and friends should never be cheated even when it „may be necessary to lie to or cheat the system“ (item #9, score 1.52). Much more than any other group, they also admitted that friends and family are important „to get [you] anywhere in the society [as] going through ordinary channels will not get you anywhere“ (#10, 2.39). Yet, more than any other group they criticize the rich for bribery and for the use of illegal means to get where they want (item #34, score 1.60).
- Compromise as a way of life. These respondents (more than any other group) admitted compromise even in the case when one is morally right (#16, score -2.15). Perhaps this willingness to compromise is the key to the synthesis of contradictions.

We have interpreted this schema in terms of post-communist syndrome because we recognize features in it which are typical of the life in communist countries. The schema resonates with post-communist mentality as we sketched it in the first part of this chapter. There is, however yet another aspect of this issue: the role of the respondents seems to be dual in nature. They seem to be both victims and culprits: hard working (#1, #21) victims who happen to be in a highly strained society with economic hardships (#21) and widespread corruption (#10, #34) as well as prejudiced (#19, #38), corrupt (and corrupting) and envious populists (#26) who eventually find their way either by cheating (#9, #10) or by some kind of compromise (#16). This „ability“ of individuals to cope with adverse conditions by accepting the foul rules confirms the undesirable *status quo* and as a matter of fact creates a vicious cycle which may lead a society from post-communism back to authoritarianism.

It is not clear why in the cross-cultural administration of the civility questionnaire, this factor turned out to be prevalently Hungarian. Hungary is a country, which belongs to those in the forefront of the transition to democracy. The comparative research data of *Sociostyles* by GfK (see results in Table 1 in Chapter 9) corroborate this fact with statistics showing that almost half of the population

holds liberal opinions and the proportion of young educated liberals is particularly high. At the time we collected our data, however, Hungary was undergoing a phase of a painful economic transformation (paradoxically enough, triggered by the neo-communist government), which could have invoked many memories of the old „securities“ of the old regime. (Hammer in 1995, pp. 30-31 reports that in 1993 27% of Hungarian population and almost half of the people under 18 lived under the poverty line.) The Poles by comparison have entered this state long time ago, while the Czechs were not yet at the stage of „tightening the belt stage.“ The Hungarians simply could have been going through a different phase of transition during which economic strain and related post-communist nostalgia were more evident.

Also, if free thinking is more often an attribute of dwellers of big cities and post-communist nostalgia is more typical for citizens of smaller communities, it would be Hungarian Debrecen, rather than the Czech capital of Prague (the heart of the Velvet Revolution) or Gdansk (the center of the Solidarity movement), where one might find citizens who harbor nostalgia for communism. At the end, it should be stressed that the Hungarian version of „goulash socialism“ in the final decades of its reign was very different from that of other Soviet satellites. It was more benign, open and humanistic as opposed to the heartbreaking and humiliating „normalization“ experienced by the Czechs, or the oppression suffered by the Poles (whose anti-Communist struggles culminated with the imposition of martial law). In contrast, Hungarian communists managed to give up their ruling position in Hungary and enabled opening the door to the Iron Curtain half a year before crumbling of the Berlin Wall.

### Schema of the Sixth Factor:

Conflict-free Lazy Con-artists: Prototypes of the „Good soldier Schweik“?

The pattern of this schema suggests the character of a literary anti-hero—the soldier Joseph Schweik—who faces the oppressive Austro-Hungarian regime, the secret police surveillance, and finally the absurdity of war. The character survives all of these adventures thanks to his lazy con-artist strategy. The author of the novel, Jaroslav Hašek (himself a member of the Communist Party for some time), does not make it clear whether Schweik succeeds thanks to his absolute naiveté or his shrewdness. (In this respect, the Schweik prototype involves both the naive and the shrewd subtypes of post-totalitarian syndrome.)

This schema is certainly not an original product of communist oppression; rather, it is a legacy of previous decades and centuries. The Communist period did not bring about the extinction of this survival strategy, but, rather, fostered it. Jedlička (1992; pp. 77-78) made a cogent analysis of „Schweiking,“ and its relation with the Communist regime:



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„Communist totalitarianism did not attempt to distance itself from this (that?) stance but, in fact, at least in theory and principle, even recognized and supported it. ‘Schweiking,’ after all, as a method and technique of resistance is effective only in the initial stage, but in its essence and long-term consequences it accommodates dictatorship.

Schweik is not merely a shrewd individual who outwits his superiors. He is also the type for whom nothing is sacred, for whom no risk is too great, and who—for the mere fact that he is allowed to live—is willing to accept any challenge. Totalitarianism is in need of precisely such individuals and, in return for this advantage, is willing to accommodate them pay even by turning a blind eye to maliciousness every so often“.

We present a detailed description of the schema below.

Table 5 presents five main factor scores. A complete listing of all factor scores is presented in the Appendix to Chapter 4.

**Table 5. - Factor VI. Conflict-free Lazy Con-artists (Schweik prototype). Five items with the highest scores. 13% Czechs, 2% Poles, no Hungarians, no Americans**

11. Nearly all people will lie when it is to their advantage	2.27
42. I agree with the slogan: Take it easy, keep calm, and	2.24
18. The Jews are clannish and aggressive.	-1.65
4. It is morally wrong to cheat in school	-2.80
44. I agree with one thing the skinheads want to do in this	-3.30

- *Dishonesty.* The schema earned a label of a „con-artist“ because most of the items related to *lying, cheating and corruption* (items #2, #3, #4, #7, #10, #11, #31, #34, #46, #51) met with the respondents' approval or indifference. Some of these items registered the highest scores among all the factors: for example, #4 claiming that it is all right to cheat at school (score .62); #11 asserting that „Nearly all people will lie when it is to their advantage“ (score 2.27); #31 disapproving of the prosecution of corruption (score 1.21). Also compromising one's principles was approved (#16, score -.62) to a degree second only to the „Post-Communist schema“ described above.
- *Benevolent law „non-enforcement.“* It was no surprise that the respondents favored benevolent law „non-enforcement,“ that is: favoring to let „a hundred criminals go free than one innocent person to be unjustly punished“ (#20, score .65). With a record high (compared to other factors) score of -3.30, they also rejected the prospect of law and order introduced by the skinheads and, with it, presumably violence, intolerance and/or law enforcement (item #44). The „con-artist“ schema might tolerate a seeming inconsistency stemming from strong approval of the item „individuals should obey laws for the good of society even if they personally disagree“ (item # 67, score 1.11) and the view of law as essential (#30, 1.00). After all, the literary prototype would certainly agree with these statements, with a broad smile, too.
- *Absence of conflict.* On the other hand, these subjects exhibited a measure of trustworthiness in that they were *good hearted and tolerant* of their fellows as well as of minorities in general (#17), the Jews (#18), the Gypsies (#39), as well as the rich (#14, #33, #40), politicians (#43, #49), and public officials (#47). They held that „all human beings are of equal importance“ (#24) and they disapproved of violence (#28). They did not perceive any significant class conflict (#26) and of course, they approved of handouts for people who refuse to work (#22).
- *The work ethic received high negative scores.* For example, there was a very high approval (and unique among all other factors) for the Schweik-like quote „Take it easy, keep calm and don't work too hard“ (item #42, score 2.24). High scores were also noted on item #1 „We work too hard [...] one is justified in avoiding work by hook or crook whenever possible“ (score 1.27); and #3 „It is all right to report ill when you need a little free time“ (score 1.56). Once again, these items received the highest scores of all of the seven factors.

### **Conceivable indicators of post-communism in the area of political culture**

A series of cross-cultural surveys was administered in order to assess the political culture in the post-communist countries by comparing the responses of samples of Central and Eastern Europeans to those of a quasi-comparative group of respondents from the U.S.A. With respect to the post-communist experience we can classify the obtained schemata (ideologies) into main three categories:

1) *Schemata inherent to a democratic society.* Political scientists have postulated a type of civic culture inherent in democratic societies and our repeated administration of the civic culture questionnaires to samples of university students has confirmed the existence of such a schema. The strongest factor explaining most of variance, whether the method was administered in Central Europe or in the United States (but not so in Russia—Mitina, 1998), has always been that of civic culture. This dominant factor is characterized by respondents with a democratic creed and a willingness to be subject to democratic laws who are neither parochial nor alienated. This schema is compatible with democratic society. Rebellious schemata with some level of sophisticated alienation may represent border-line democratic schemata, as they contain, in addition to beneficial alert activism also potentially destructive tendencies.

2) *Schemata implying non-democratic socialization* and a legacy of oppression, not necessarily of communist origin. A typical product of extreme oppression is parochialism which suggests not only the absence of democracy but also the absence of modernity, a lack of knowledge about politics. Although this schema was rare among dominant schemata of Central European and American students, we registered it in the pilot studies among Russian students (Mitina 1998)—this finding also corresponds to data of GfK, which assessed 57% of Russian population as parochial.

3) *Schemata suggesting a post-communist legacy.* The typical schema which can be qualified as post-communist, is that of respondents who have a fairly good notion of democracy and are able to be critical of the flaws of their regime but are unwilling to stand up and actively express their opinion publicly. It is the schema of the „Passive Critics of Politics,“ which corresponds to the public versus private schism typical of totalitarian societies. We registered this type of schema among Slovak students (during the rule of Prime Minister Meciar). This set of opinions also accounted for a major Russian factor and represents almost a mirror image of the „rebellious schemata“ (primarily found among Americans and Poles).

Below is an empirical illustration of results of Q-factor analysis (four factor solution) of ipsative responses to items of civic culture, which were addressed to Czech, Slovak, Polish, and American students. A detailed description of the study can be found in Chapter 3.

**Table 6. - Civic Culture of Czech, Slovak, Polish, and American Students.**

Schemata	Czechs	Slovak	Poles	Americans
I Civic Culture	44%	20%	24%	38%
II. Alienated and Sophisticated „Gung-ho“ Rebels	7%	10%	19%	24%
III. Passive Critics of	6%	48%	1%	1%
IV. Passive Apoliticals	11%	8%	3%	4%

**Schema I. Civic Culture: Loyal Participant Democrats.** This is predominantly a Czech-American factor, although a substantial number of Poles and Slovaks also loaded on it. This result contradicted our original hypothesis that „the post-totalitarian respondents“ would in general differ from American respondents. The schema represents the kind of civic culture congruent with stable democracy (participation in and emphasis on some items of subject culture are necessary to the notion of civic culture). Respondents overwhelmingly deny alienation and claim they are knowledgeable about politics. They agree with democratic principles of participation and very strongly assert their loyalty to the state and government as well as their unconditional respect for law and authority. Although there is a devotion to the democratic system and democratic procedures, there is more agreement with respect for democracy in general (sympathy for parties and elections, for representative democracy) and less agreement with partisan activism and interest groups activities.

**Schema II. Alienated and Sophisticated „Gung-ho“ Rebels.** This is a predominantly US-Polish factor. (The findings suggest a spirit of rebelliousness in American and Polish respondents and are a reflection of the political uprisings in American and Polish history). The typical feature of this schema is a striking rejection of deference to authority, be it in the form of the state, the government, or laws. Although there is a consistent expression of political alienation, this alienation does not at all resemble passive cynicism—on the contrary, a distinct acceptance of participatory items (particularly those stressing active involvement) represent the second most salient trait of this schema.

**Schema III. Passive Critics of Politics.** This factor explained 8.7% of the total variance. Slovak subjects loaded on it almost exclusively: the most striking features of this factor include the assertion of alienation from the current system and an intense dissatisfaction with government. At the same time there is lukewarmness or denial of one's own active participation in the political process. There is mild but consistent agreement with the democratic creed, favorable attitudes toward obedience to laws, and admission of parochial political ignorance.

**Schema IV. Passive Apoliticals.** This factor explained 7% of the total variance and characterized 12 Czechs, 9 Slovaks, 5 Americans and 4 Poles who loaded relatively high. This factor, on which slightly more Czechs and Slovaks load than other nationalities, has distinctly parochial features. Respondents confess that politics makes little difference in their life (the highest factor score, 2.33) and that people can be helped by their families and friends rather than by states and governments. Passivity is the other distinct feature:

„participation“ items are either strongly rejected or receive only low positive scores. The respondents are ambivalent toward the other two scales - subjection and alienation.

## Conclusion

The post-communist syndrome appears to be a useful concept for theory (conceptualization of the psychological legacy of post-communist oppression) as well as for practical applications (interpretation of ideologies in post-communist societies, assessment of personality profiles). The newly liberated nations manifest almost identical patterns of post-totalitarian mentality. It is critical to distinguish different subtypes within the post-communist syndrom: the „helpless“ and „abusive“ variety. Still, it would be a mistake to generalize and ascribe the syndrome to entire formerly oppressed populations. Our studies demonstrate that the occurrence of post-totalitarian syndrom in young, educated samples from big cities may be minimal.

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## ***Types of Citizenship***

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### **Introduction**

When the magnificent wave of peaceful revolutions lifted the Soviet oppression from the countries of Central/Eastern Europe, it seemed that once the yoke disappeared, there was nothing that would prevent the liberated nations from a fast, spontaneous recuperation. A rapid boost of economic growth was expected once the rigid planning and Russian exploitation was discontinued and a spontaneous restoration of democratic regimes seemed to be self-evident (at least in the countries with a democratic legacy).

Yet, market economy, national and minority coexistence, legal systems and interpersonal relations in general did not simply switch from the state of oppression to a benign state of peaceful efficiency. At least not within months or years as predicted. Today, 10 years later, we are thinking in terms of decades and generations instead. The cause for the relatively small success can be ascribed to social-political milieu and various cultural and psychological reasons. The following pages attempt to shed some light and systematic perspective on the social and psychological aspects.

### **Cross-national and cross generational perspectives**

The following section presents a review of four studies which (each from its own angle) map main characteristics of populations in Central Europe. A shorthand description of the studies and of the main typologies relevant to the democratization process is given.

## ***Part I. Empirical surveys citizens in cross-national and cross generational perspectives.***

### ***1. National perspective typology of adult lifestyles in the Czech Republic***

Leo Burnett Advertising/AISA (1995, 1997)

An intensive study that focused on the lifestyles of the contemporary Czech population was carried out by Leo Burnett Advertising in cooperation with AISA (hereafter L.Burnett/Aisa) in 1995 and 1997. A representative sample of 1251 subjects provided an array of data ranging from marketing information to political attitudes. The data were factor analyzed and yielded a typology of nine contemporary Czech lifestyles (see Figure 1). The fictitious masculine or feminine names illustrate the gender prevalence of each particular type. The location in the graph reflects their position of individual types on the scale of the *social economic status* (vertical dimension) and *general activity* (horizontal dimension).

The typical representatives of the extracted types can be briefly described as follows: Robert is a young entrepreneur, an active agent of changes, interested in economics and politics, strongly individualistic and often almost ostentatiously disinterested in morality and ethical values. Lady Emilie is a representative of the mature generation, the real lady of culture and democratic morality. She indeed combines the good old conservative values of decency and discipline with progressive and all-rounded interests in culture and current politics.

Luxury seeking ambitious Helena predominantly focuses on consumerism rather than being interested in social and political agenda. Jakub & Bára represent youth with many diverse interests. They invest in their self-growth, education, and show the greatest involvement in the global issues and solidarity with their fellow-citizens. Daniel & Lucka illustrate a type of young impatient hedonists, they enjoy music, love, and freedom. Types Jan & Jana cherish shallow materialistic dreams which they generally fail to realize. Milan & Milena are frustrated, negativistic and passive. They also harbor strongest authoritarian tendencies.

Venca the Handyman and Mane the Homemaker are parochials, uninterested in political life. In general, the active and high status types in the upper right quadrant happen to be the supporters of the democratic and market economy trends, the passive and low status types in lower left are either apolitical or nostalgic for the old paternalistic communist regime.

A replication of this study two years later (1997) confirmed the general pattern of the results and detected certain trends. First of all, it showed a growing polarization of society. On one hand, there was a significant rise in dissatisfaction of most of the passive and low social status types, on the other hand, almost all active types have increased their status and activity. For example, types of Robert and Helena have merged („married“ ) and created „the new elites“ type. Jakub and Bára, „the first generation of the post-communist adults;“ became more consumerist but preserved their main characteristics which are intelligence and democratic creed. What seems to be most important, lady Emilie (who represented the oldest group in the study of 1995) „got younger,“ representing now two dominant age groups: one in their 50's and another in their 30's. This finding can be interpreted in optimistic terms, that is, the „upright democratic character“ prevails and has been handed down to younger generations.

### ***2. Cross national perspective: central European mentalities, Fessel-GfK(1997)***

Market research institute Fessel-GfK (Austria) interviewed 1000 subjects from household samples from each Central/Eastern European country (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania) and 2000 respondents from Russia. Questions covered various themes, including life priorities, hopes and worries, leisure activities, national stereotypes and financial strategies. Correspondence analysis of the data resulted in 13 motivational drives and five mentalities“ [the original labels by the authors of the




Figure 1. Typology of Adult Lifestyles in the Czech Republic by Leo Burnett Advertising & Aisa 1995, 1997


Fessel-GfK study appear in square brackets, the labels in italics were created by the author of this article. The „mentalities“ are positioned on the Sociomap (Figure 2) with respect to their *activity* (horizontal dimension of Ambition vs. Passivity) and according to their *optimism* (vertical dimension Hope vs. Disillusionment). The characteristics of the mentalities as they follow from the data of the Czech sample are described below:

*Enlightened Liberals* [Establishment]. Motivated mainly by search for humanism and harmony, this group represents almost equally all ages except the oldest group, those over 60 years. Often with university education, these people are hopeful, ambitious, self-efficacious and also tolerant, willing to cooperate and compromise. They seem to be the most responsible, altruistic, and humanistic. They are worried by disappearing moral values and rising crime rates, yet they are advocates of liberalism, personal freedoms and responsibility. They believe in technology but are concerned about its impact on humans and ecology. They are very supportive of post-1989 developments: privatization and free market. They have well-rounded interests, their idea of self-actualization is in development of personality, integrity, a vision and a common aim.

*Young Educated Liberals* [Newcomers]. Motivated mainly by idealism and adventure, this is the youngest group of all, composed of well-educated people with very good income, more likely to live in the state's capital than anywhere else. They are optimistic, dynamic, flexible and like new challenges and excitement, yet in contrast to the Alienated New-Rich, they prefer dialogue, are willing to settle conflicts and agree on aims which unify people. Their view of self-actualization is primarily in developing one's personality, keeping its originality and integrity, and also in the professional success. They are tolerant, most egalitarian of all groups with respect to gender roles. They have an ecological conscience and are concerned about the dangers modern technology may bring. They support privatization and the free market, they sympathize openly with the Western world and express loyalty to their representatives.

*Alienated New-Rich* [Winners]. They are usually teen-agers or middle aged, with above average income who claim to be unemployed, freelance, homemakers or students. They often live in the state's capital or by the Western border, mostly single or divorced. They are motivated prevalently by seeking of fun, fortune, and building up of their ego. As a group the Alienated New-Rich are extremely self-centered and hedonistic, seeking excitement and comfort. They seem to replace a sense of stability and trust in institutions with enchantment by technology and a strong urge for personal achievement at the expense of other people, their own health and concern for the future. They do not avoid conflicts and do challenge their opponents, they do not compromise but respect the decision of the stronger and power of orders. They tend to make the most of their life, their idea of self-realization is in financial success rather than in professional achievement or personal self-realization.

*Certitude Seeking Authoritarians* [Traditionalists]. Motivated mostly by seeking of certitude, quietness and faith, these are mostly elderly people with elementary education and low income, more often women than men. Supporters of authoritarian respect for law and order, they call for „more rules for good conduct“ and „moral certainty.“ They remain faithful to the traditional virtues, e.g., self-control, placing duty before pleasure, respect for religion and stereotypical gender roles. They are most willing to sacrifice the right of free speech and uncensored media for a moral cause. They are strong advocates of state paternalism, most tolerant of communism and socialism and skeptical about capitalism and technological progress. They warn against blending of cultures and a loss of national identity. Condemning individualism, they seek safety in conformity and closeness with people of their kind, seeking a peaceful job rather than personal success and avoiding all possible risks.



**Figure 2. Central European Mentalities with Average and Contrasting Values (GfK 1997)**

*Assistance Seeking Parochials* [Re-rootings]. Motivated by seeking assistance, guidance and shelter, they are mostly older, widowed people in rural areas, with little education and a low income. „Having often experienced deprivation and disillusionment, these people do not believe in future and turn with their hopes to materialistic well-being.“ Naive and passive, they do not perceive the return of communism as a threat.

The above described profiles and citations from GfK report (1997) clearly suggest which types are best fit and *most helpful for transition to the democratic society*. The democratic civic culture is clearly represented by the Enlightened Liberals who personify the democratic creed together with hope and a fair amount of ambition. This profile is complemented by even younger and more educated Young Educated Liberals who seem to be a fresh new democratic generation.

The *potentially non-democratic*, anti-civic types involve Alienated New Rich, Assistance Seeking Parochials and Certitude Seeking Authoritarians. The role of the Alienated New Rich in the democratic transitions is highly questionable. Although these successful entrepreneurs show payoff for activity and self-efficacy, their alienation and unscrupulousness legitimizes contempt for law and authorities, and their short-sighted hedonism crushes whatever moral codes could have been preserved from the pre-communist era. The pragmatic and alienated philosophy of the New Rich tends to blend with the overall trends of postmodern relativization of morality and decline in democratic humanism. Assistance Seeking Parochials and the Certitude Seeking Authoritarians may be seduced by populist slogans that often use the democratic rhetoric (equality, morality, vision, common aim, and authority) but which may result in the very opposite—disrespect of individual, authoritarian orders, totalitarianism.

The research by GfK enables also international comparisons of various states of Central/Eastern Europe. Figure 2 presents average data as well as data from contrasting nations (Russia and Hungary). Table 1 presents available data from all eight nations. There are striking differences between nations that have experienced some period of sovereignty and democracy (e.g., Hungary and the Czech Republic) and those that have not (Russia being the most extreme example).

**Table 1. - Cross-National Comparison of Central European Mentalities (GfK 1997)**

CENTRAL EUROPEAN MENTALITIES (%)								
GROUPS	MEAN	RUSSIA	ROMANIA	BULGARIA	POLAND	SLOVAKIA	CZECH REPUBLIC	HUNGARY
Enlightened LIBERALS	17	1	6	13	8	34	41	27
Young Educated LIBERALS	14	6	27	24	34	12	12	32
Alienated NEW RICH	17	30	22	11	9	7	8	7
Certitude seeking AUTHORITARIANS	23	5	25	35	28	31	28	28
Assistance seeking PAROCHIALS	28	57	21	17	21	15	12	5

### 3. Generational perspective: young people in the Czech Republic, Fessel-GfK (1997)

Fessel-GfK carried out a research focused exclusively on Czech youth 14-24 years old, *The World of Young People*. Altogether 2001 subjects were selected by a combination of quota and random sampling. Face to face interviews covered issues from value orientations (choosing between pairs of value statements), opinions on politics, preferred leisure activities, consumer opinions and market behavior. It was the reaction to the 22 value choices that were factor analyzed and yielded six value dimensions, the main dimensions being *activity vs. passivity* and *cautiousness vs. carelessness* (Figure 3). The less significant dimensions included openness vs. closed mindedness, altruism vs. egoism, trust in authorities vs. trust in abilities, and strength of inner drive vs. adaptability. The cluster analysis resulted in the typology below. [The original labels by the authors of the Fessel-GfK study appear in square brackets, the labels in italics were created by the author of this article].

*Self-actualizing Responsible Liberals* [Avantgardists] are the most energetic, positive and self-efficacious type. Primarily motivated by the need to succeed, to lead and fulfill their potential, they are educated, enlightened, and cultured. Yet they are also cooperative and willing to adapt creatively. They are socially, environmentally and politically cautious. They enjoy freedom, hold the democratic creed and are law-abiding. Women prevail in this factor.


*Principled Materialists* [Rational Materialists] are the other type that personifies activity and a great deal of caution. They are the most numerous type of all. Its representatives do not hide their material inclinations and unwillingness to sacrifice one's prosperity for the sake of others. On the other hand, they are not only rational and calculating but also principled, reliable and responsible. This is more a masculine than feminine factor.

*Submissive Altruists* [Cooperative Altruists] embody a cautious but inactive type and is comprised more often from women than from men. This caring, helping, and law-abiding, calm home and family type opts for safety, cooperation, compromise and avoids conflicts. Being aware of social, environmental, health and religious issues, a representative of this type is not very efficacious.

*Safety-seeking Conformists* [Cautious Traditionalists] are even more cautious and passive than the previous type. These subjects feel best in the safety of their home and in a peaceful job. Rather than taking a challenge they prefer to let themselves drift along. Attempting to keep a low profile, they conform, live moderately and inconspicuously. They prefer to meet their own kind, are ready to

compromise to avoid all conflicts. They do not like to change their habits and customs. They are skeptical of the possibility of influencing public affairs, in fact they rather express trust in the state and public functions. Although they do not display distinct political preferences, since they tend to be more egalitarians than freedom lovers they tend to be more tolerant of authoritarianism and communism than any other type. They enjoy watching TV, playing cards and taking care of a garden. Outside of the safety of their own they feel alienated and helpless.

**Figure 3. - Generational Perspective: The World of Young People in the Czech Republic (GfK 1996)**



The last two types appear to be distinctly careless, differing only in the level of their activity:

The passive careless *Shallow and Lazy Consumers* [Passive Fatalists] are typically males from little towns who lack aspirations, hobbies, higher education, career, and do not care about their appearance. They like a peaceful and quiet life and kill boredom by passively listening to music, enjoying cars, consuming alcohol and tobacco, playing with slot machines, and socializing with their friends.

Their active opposites are *Risk-taking Hedonists* [Adventurers]. Impulsive and irresponsible, they enjoy all that life can offer. Confrontational and law-breaking, this type likes to socialize and is interested in music which has more meaning than just a hobby. This type tends to be apolitical.

The types that favor *democratic transitions* the most are Self-actualizing Responsible Liberals, followed by the most active from Submissive Altruists and majority of Principled Materialists. The latter may not be excited by the concept of democracy itself but are efficient and reliable enough to support the stability of the regime once it is established.

The types that are in the greatest *opposition against any democratic change* are the Safety-seeking Conformists (lovers of old orders, resisting changes, they support most often the authoritarian or communist orders) and Shallow Lazy Consumers. Both these types detest the byproducts of transition, i.e., competition for jobs and resulting unemployment, deregulation of consumer prices, and the collapse of the paternalistic welfare system they liked to rely on. On the other hand, since both the types are distinctly passive, there is less of a danger they themselves would actively mobilize and actively resist democracy once it has been introduced. The (mostly apolitical) Risk Taking Hedonists may be dangerous to the fledgling democracy as their impulsive self-indulgence and inclination to trespass against the laws predispose them to exploitive antisocial behavior.

#### 4. *Generational cross-national perspective civic culture of university students.*

Feierabend et al. (1992, 1997)

This international project was initiated by I. K. Feierabend and methodologically refined by C. R. Hofstetter, both from San Diego State University, U.S.A. The study was inspired by classic works of Almond and Verba (1989), their notion that civic political culture constitutes the basis of stable democracy and their postulation that civic culture is comprised of modern „participant“ dimension (being informed and active), „subject“ aspect (being loyal subject), and „parochial“ factor (indifference of politics, or not even being aware of it). The converse of civic culture is alienation.

Below is an example of one of the cross-cultural studies in civic culture (a detailed description of which is in chapter 3, pp. 91-100). A sample of 464 university students from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and the U.S.A. was administered a Q-sort version of Civic Culture questionnaire, and the results were analyzed using the Q-factor analysis. The strongest factors explained 44.4% variance:

*Factor I. Civic Culture.* The schema of this factor represented the kind of civic culture congruent with stable democracy. The respondents overwhelmingly denied alienation and claimed they were knowledgeable about politics, agreed with democratic participation and asserted strongly their loyalty to state and government as well as their unconditional respect for law and authorities. It was predominantly a Czech-American factor, although a substantial number of Poles and Slovaks also loaded on it. This result contradicted our original assumption that the responses of individuals from post-Communist countries would sharply differ from those of U.S. respondents.

*Factor II. Alienated and Sophisticated „Gung-ho“ Rebels.* Respondents who loaded on this factor strikingly rejected deference to authority, whether it was the state, government or laws. The second most salient trait of this schema was a distinct acceptance of participatory items, particularly those stressing active involvement. This predominantly US-Polish factor also evoked political uprisings in American and Polish history.


*Factor III. Passive Critics of Politics.* Slovak subjects loaded almost exclusively on this factor. It asserted alienation from the current system and intense dissatisfaction with government. At the same time there was lukewarmness or even resolute denial of one's own active participation in the political process, a mild but consistent agreement with the democratic creed, favorable attitude toward obedience to laws, and admission of parochial political ignorance.

*Factor IV. Passive Apoliticals.* This schema had distinctly parochial features (more typical of Czechs and Slovaks than others). Respondents confessed that politics made little difference in their lives and that people could be helped better by their families and friends than by states and governments. Passivity was a distinct feature, „Participative“ items were either strongly rejected or received only low positive scores. The respondents were ambivalent toward the other two scales—subjecting and alienation.

While *democracy may be threatened* by excessive deference among the Czechs and passivity among the Slovak students, the American and Polish students seem to question the regime from the other side, from the platform of alienated rebels.

In any case, the study suggested that there is a significant democratic potential among the young students who were socialized under various political conditions.

Figure 3: Pictorial Summary of Main Results of the Civic Culture Study



## **Part II. citizenship in the countries undergoing transition to democracy: attempt at a theoretical synthesis**

### **1. Recognition of variance in the meaning of citizenship**

The empirical studies presented in Part I (perhaps most graphically Table 1) prove a *considerable variance* in civic attitudes of inhabitants of various countries as well as variance within those countries. That fact is of a crucial importance for the countries that are undergoing a transition to democracy. The types of citizenship span such a diversity that it may be even debatable whether some of the „non-civic“ categories (asocial, antisocial) still deserve the „citizenship“ label.

It would be a challenging academic task to analyze and explain such variety from the psychological, historical, sociological and political perspective. One might prove the hypothesis that cultures with democratic experience (e.g., the Czech Republic) would display more democratic citizenship and less parochialism than countries where a democratic legacy is absent (some nations of the ex-Soviet Union). It would be also interesting to document the differences between generations, between individuals with different child-rearing styles, etc.


Besides academic, there are many practical issues where political psychology can contribute to the democratization of the world. *Assessment of meanings of citizenship should be a base* from which curricula for fostering citizenship should be designed; it should be a baseline for social policy, etc. One example for all: the assistance programs to countries in transition seem to underestimate the incidence of „Antisocial Predatory Citizenship.“ That causes the allocated resources to be worse than ineffective—they may be counterproductive if financial help ends as a support for local mafias rather than as a help to the needy or fortification of democratic legal state.

### **2. Hypothetical genesis of various types of citizenship - figure 4**

The hypothetical development of the basic types of citizenship in a post-totalitarian country is sketched in Figure 4. We assume that *oppression* leads to paternalism and the condition of paternalism keeps the population in:

- a) a dependent state of ignorance and passivity and therefore on the level of „Asocial“ („asocial“ meaning unattached to wider social networks), „*Passive Citizenship*“ (applies more to underdeveloped nations); or
- b) a conviction of vulgar egalitarianism and therefore on the demanding and immature level of „*Social, Welfare Citizenship*“ which undercuts initiative and responsibility. (Chapter 7 entirely focuses on the relation between oppression and deficit in responsibility.)

Figure 4. - Hypothetical Genesis of Various Types of Citizenship



Liberation leads to a market economy and triggers a powerful swing to consumerism and „Consuming, Hedonistic Citizenship“ core of which lies in the need to satisfy shallow needs (not the growth-needs in Maslow terminology) and satisfy them fast. The needs that Consuming Hedonistic Citizens seek to have satisfied obviously are not the „growth“ needs in Maslow’s terminology (self-actualization, transcendence, aesthetics) but mostly basic physiological needs, sensation and excitement, and the need to boost one’s ego by ownership instead by self-development and achievement.

Saturated masses may shift from social citizenship to consumer citizenship

Democratization (decomposition of totalitarian system, liberalization of society and introduction of free market) is inevitably accompanied by disruption of legal continuity and authority of law-enforcement institutions. This leads to an increase in crime and to the development of new forms of crime. The strata that are the fastest to orient in the new situation are the former powerful (i. e., communist) elites ensuring their political influence though economic power. Routing the flow of wealth through privatization channels is not difficult for a well-connected brotherhood of „communist mafias,“ nor is the swapping of Marxist-Leninist ideology and „das Kapital“ for (financial) capital.



point (e.g., asocial-passive-parochials, social-welfare types, hedonistic consumers or potential antisocial predators).

#### 4. Types of citizenship in countries in transition

**Incidence.** Table 2 attempts to match the theoretical typology of respective types of citizenship (described in Figure 61 with typologies derived from empirical studies (lifestyles, mentalities, types of political culture, as they were described in Part I of this chapter). It may be concluded that the theoretical framework can be well illustrated by the real-life types and vice versa, the empirical types resonate with one or more respective types from our typology.

Application: The issue of coping with transition

Typological approach enables a differentiated, and therefore more valid approach to various social issues. We have mentioned earlier in this Part II the necessity to take into consideration various meanings of citizenship when allocating financial help to citizens or when choosing strategies in education for responsible citizenship. The next paragraph is devoted to another topical issue - the problem of coping with political transition.

Hopson & Adams (1976, p. 8) define successful coping as a process consisting of (quote): a. managing feelings, utilizing them and not being overwhelmed by them; b. producing effective behaviors required by the new situations; c. utilizing the opportunity value contained in the new situation for personal growth

With these specific requirements in mind it is easy to determine that it is the Democratic Responsible Citizens who *cope the best* (specifically, the Self-actualizing Liberals from GfK survey of the Czech Youth and Jakub & Bára from L.Burnett/Aisa survey).

Consuming Hedonists and Antisocial Predatory Citizens (Alienated New-Rich from GfK cross-cultural survey; Risk-Taking Hedonists and Shallow Consumers from GfK survey of the Czech Youth; Helena, Daniel & Lucka, and potentially Robert from L.Burnett/Aisa survey) typically do produce effective behavior in the new situations and manage their feelings but do not seem to use the new challenge for their personal growth, therefore their coping can be considered borderline.

The types that seem to fail to cope are the Asocial Passive Citizens and the Social Welfare Citizens. The former, Asocial Passive Citizens, were in empirical surveys identified as: Assistance-Seeking Parochials in cross-cultural GfK survey; Passive Apoliticals in Feierabend et al. study; and the types of Venca and Marie from L.Burnett/Aisa survey. The latter, the Social Welfare Citizens, were empirically identified as Certitude-Seeking Authoritarians in cross-cultural GfK survey, Safety-Seeking Conformists in GfK survey in Czech Youth; and Milan & Milena and Jan & Jana from in L.Burnett/Aisa survey. Both kinds of types tend to display symptoms opposite to what Hopson & Adams pointed out as successful coping. We can observe in them:

- a) prevalence of negative emotions
- b) ineffective responses to the new challenge
- c) regression rather than personal growth in confrontation with new situations.

#### 5. Hypothetical relation between types of citizenship and transition to democracy - figure 6

What is the *source of democratic culture*? The active component of the population? In the transitory societies there is a struggle between the *active types* in the society—all of them supporting democratic changes, yet each for different reasons. There is an undeclared struggle among the guardians of democratic and humanistic values, the freedom loving unscrupulous entrepreneurs, and hedonistic consumers. Although in general all the active types do support the liberal political changes, it does not mean they also uphold the democratic civic culture and responsibility. For example, the young hedonists (impatient youth Daniel & Lucka as well as luxury seeking ambitious

Helena from L.Burnett/AISA study. Risk taking Hedonists from the Czech GfK or Alienated New Rich from Central European GfK) predominantly focus on consumerism rather than being interested in social and political issues. On the other hand, the most active and socially accomplished types (e.g., Robert the Entrepreneur from L.Burnett/AISA research and Alienated Rebels from Feierabend et al.) happen to be very much interested in politics and economics, yet they tend to be individualistic and often almost ostentatiously disinterested in morality and cooperative compromise. Alienated New Rich and Risk Taking Hedonists from GfK surveys do not feel any responsibility toward their fellow citizens. They display a worrisome level of cynicism and antisociality. Active but non-democratic types may swing the society from the path of „transition“ to democracy in another direction, „transformation“ toward a nonstandard regime of a lawless chaos or to some „third way“ hybrid between democracy and authoritarianism.

Therefore, for the sake of transition to democracy, it is necessary not only to cultivate activism but also civic virtues and the democratic creed. It is desirable to support *democratic citizenship represented* by the guardians of the old democratic traditions (Emilie by L.Burnett/AISA, self-actualizing democratic youth (Jakub & Bára by L.Burnett/AISA), representatives of Civic Culture (Feierabend et al.). Enlightened Liberals of all ages, Submissive Altruists (GfK Central European), and Self-Actualizing Liberals (Czech GfK). The empowerment of these types, fostering their activism, self-efficacy and support to civic virtues (in the post-totalitarian environment otherwise ridiculed) seem to be the best investments for democracy.

*Opposition to democratic development* (or indifference about it) may have various causes:

- Parochial indifference in the cases of „Asocial Passive Citizenship“ (Venca the Handyman or Marie the Homemaker from L.Burnett/AISA study, Assistance Seeking Parochials from cross-cultural GfK or Passive Apoliticals from Feierabend et al. Research);
- frustrated negativism of Welfare Citizens (lazy Milan & Milena from L.Burnett/AISA, Passive Critics of Politics from Feierabend et al); and
- inability to realize shallow materialistic dreams (dissatisfied consumers Jan & Jana from L.Burnett/AISA, Shallow Consumers from Czech GfK).



The authoritarian paternalistic regime is the favorite system for the last two categories since it may let them live without freedom but in relative comfort in a state with a strong leader and strictly enforced rules.

All the *passive types* block the development of civic culture that would foster democracy. Although it might seem that the mass of „passive“ and negativistic people may not be likely to influence the course of the society, unfortunately, it is not so. They were trained in totalitarian times to vote obediently and they usually exercise their right and cast their ballot to slow down or reverse transition to democracy. They vote for the authoritarian populist left extremist or for xenophobic and chauvinistic right extremists.

The encouraging news from our analysis is that some of the societies under study, particularly the nations of Central Europe that have a previous positive experience with democratic regimes and peaceful conflict resolution (Klicperová et al 1997b) seem to have their own *human resources for sustaining* and developing their *democratic regimes*. However, from our experience, they would benefit from a legal and moral support. Another part of the good news is that the „good old democratic values“ do not seem to weaken as time passes and their original witnesses age. The young generation inherited them despite totalitarian educational brainwashing (and lives up to them). This was proved by the longitudinal shifts of democratic creed from the ladies of the oldest generation to middle aged women in L.Burnett/AISA study, also in young student elites who have been socialized under a totalitarian regime. There was no substantial deficit in civic culture when they were compared with their American counterparts.

However, other societies which have not experienced prosperous democracy in their national history and where more than half of society can be labeled as Asocial/Parochial Citizens, Social Welfare Citizens with authoritarian inclinations and Antisocial/Predatory Citizens of alienated new rich, seem to be at risk. These societies, after a long and vain wait „for democracy to be introduced to them,“ may either swing back to some form of authoritarian system or „transform“ themselves into nonstandard semi-democratic regimes without an effective legal base.

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